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Hesse and Pettit present somewhat different reconstructions of Rorty's 
suggestions about the discipline that might survive the collapse of 
foundationalistic epistemology. They both treat Rorty's argument very 
respectfully, as opening the way to an interesting new possibility. I think 
that they are both too charitable to him; I think that there are a lot of bad 
arguments in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, and a quantity of simple 
silliness. This is not to say that the openings up of the subject that Hesse 
and Pettit derive from Rorty are not genuinely attractive. What I would 
challenge is the suggestion that they are forced upon us by the collapse of 
the rest of the subject. I see no reason to believe this. 
According to Rorty, something central disappears from philosophy if 
(a) we cease to see human knowledge as based on indubitable evidence, 
and (b) we accept that intellectual life inevitably divides into different 
more-or-less autonomous currents, traditions, or discourses, each with its 
own presuppositions and procedures, and between which translation is 
beset with difficulties of principle. It is pretty clear why if both of these are 
true then a certain 'Cartesian' enterprise of grounding all we know on 
foundations no-one would doubt is hopeless. The truth of either of them 
would be fatal enough. But this is a pretty small target: Descartes on a 
traditional but historically by no means uncontroversial interpretation, 1 
Russell for a few moments during the 1920's, perhaps, a few incautious 
people in Vienna between the wars, ... Most of the enterprise of trying to 
sort out how people do acquire their knowledge of the world, and how they 
can best do so, is not directly incriminated. Several of the papers of this 
conference have shown how wide and open the live questions about 
scientific method in seventeenth and early eighteenth century Europe were. 
An orthodoxy defined by the Descartes of first-year philosophy certainly 
did not rule then. And the issues that were broached then have obviously 
developed into questions which continue to have a place in the scientific 
enterprise. Real questions of method are an intrinsic part of our situation; 
we attack them from within; this is worth doing; it is called epistemology. 
How does Rorty get from his attack on foundationalism to his rejection 
of all of epistemology? I'm afraid I have trouble avoiding libel here. As far 
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as I can make out, he does it with three manoeuvres: (i) identifying 
foundationalism with Descartes, describing Descartes' position in terms of 
a Rylean optical metaphor, and then refocus sing the optics so that the 
metaphor encompasses a much more comprehensive project; (ii) saddling 
non-foundationalistic epistemology with a 'realist' programme in the 
analysis of truth and reference, and then launching a free-wheeling attack 
on this programme; (iii) appealing to the authority of a number of modern 
masters, particularly Dewey, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein, all of whom are 
supposed to have expressed the same exhortation to abandon philosophy 
as we know it and move over to some sort of hermeneutics. 
Briefly: (i) needs no comment. (ii) is potentially interesting. I don't think 
that Rorty says enough to show that the epistemologist must adopt any 
particul-ar theory of truth or reference. And I think that his attacks on 
Field, Putnam, and others are confused. But there is an intelligible strategy 
here, and if it succeeded something significant would have been shown. 
(iii) seems to me to turn the fact that these thinkers had enemies in 
common into a claim that they were making the same attacks on these 
enemies. It would be easier to settle this if Rorty's taste in heroes did not 
focus so consistently on such elusive writers. 
So you can see why I am not impressed. That is not to say that Rorty's 
alternatives to philosophy are illusions. What seems to me an obvious 
illusion is just the suggestion that they are alternatives we must follow. 
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I See for example Margaret D. Wilson, Descartes (London: Routledge, 1978), especially 
Chapter I, Sec. 8, Chapter 4, Sec. I, and the Conclusion. As I read Wilson, Descartes, as she 
reads him, does not possess a working notion of evidence, and sees the grounds for assent 
in more archaic terms. Descartes, if this is right, did not really take a stand with respect to 
(a). He does not deny (b) either, as I have stated it, though he certainly thinks that all systems 
except one are (demonstrably) wrong. 
